BSI

BSI Co-Seal Profile

Joint Publications
16
All Time
Unique Partners
33
agencies co-sealed with
Most Frequent Partner
CCCS
16 joint publications

Co-Sealed With

CCCS 16
ASD/ACSC 15
NCSC-UK 14
FBI 14
NCSC-NZ 14
CISA 13
NSA 13
DC3 8
NUKIB 7
MIVD 6
NCO 6
NCSC-NL 6
Other 48

Partner Frequency — All Time

CCCS
16
ASD/ACSC
15
NCSC-UK
14
FBI
14
NCSC-NZ
14
CISA
13
NSA
13
DC3
8
NUKIB
7
MIVD
6
NCO
6
NCSC-NL
6
AIVD
5
EPA
4
SKW
4
ANSSI
3
DOE
3
AISE
3
AISI
3
AW
3
CNI
3
SUPO
3
NCSC-SE
2
EC3
2
CSA
2
ACN
1
CERT-EU
1
NISC
1
NIS
1
DDIS
1
EFIS
1
USCC
1
TSA
1
Joint Publications (16) — All Time
Date Publication Co-Sealers
2026-05-12 Software Bill of Materials for AI - Minimum Elements A software bill of materials (SBOM) acts as an “ingredients list” for software that better positions organizations to understand their supply chains and make risk-informed decisions about how to protect their critical systems. The guidance builds on CISA’s previous work with federal and international partners to establish a shared vision for a software bill of materials and provides recommendations on minimum elements that should be included in a… ACN ANSSI CCCS CERT-EU CISA NCSC-UK NISC
2026-04-23 Defending Against China-Nexus Covert Networks of Compromised Devices Over the past few years there has been a major shift in the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used by China-nexus cyber actors, moving away from the use of individually procured infrastructure, and towards the use of externally provisioned, large-scale networks of compromised devices. AIVD ASD/ACSC CCCS CISA DC3 FBI MIVD NCO NCSC-NZ NCSC-SE NCSC-UK NSA
2026-04-23 International cyber agencies share fresh advice to defend against China-linked covert networks GCHQ’s National Cyber Security Centre with UK industry and 15 international partners shine light on best protections against methods used by China-linked threat actors. Covert networks, often made up of compromised devices such as smart devices, are being used to disguise the origins and attributions of cyber attacks. AIVD ASD/ACSC CCCS CISA DC3 FBI MIVD NCO NCSC-NZ NCSC-SE NCSC-UK NSA
2026-01-14 Secure Connectivity Principles for Operational Technology SSeeccuurree CCoonnnneeccttiivviittyy PPrriinncciipplleess ffoorr OOppeerraattiioonnaall TTeecchhnnoollooggyy ((OOTT)) Operational technology (OT) environments - which have long been centred on safety, uptime, and operational continuity - are now more interconnected than ever. ASD/ACSC CCCS FBI NCSC-NL NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK
2025-12-15 Principles for the Secure Integration of Artificial Intelligence in Operational Technology CISA | ASD’s ACSC | NSA AISC | FBI | Cyber Centre | BSI | NCSC-NL | NCSC-NZ | NCSC-UK Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................... 3 Important Terminology ....................................................................................................................................... 3 Scope ................... ASD/ACSC CCCS CISA FBI NCSC-NL NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA
2025-12-09 Pro-Russia Hacktivists Conduct Opportunistic Attacks Against US and Global Critical Infrastructure Actions for Operational Technology Owners and Operators to Take Today to Mitigate Cyber Threats Related to Pro-Russia Hacktivists Activity Reduce exposure of operational technology (OT) assets to the public-facing internet. Adopt mature asset management processes, including mapping data flows and access points. Ensure that OT assets are using robust authentication procedures. ASD/ACSC CCCS CISA DC3 DOE EC3 EPA FBI NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA NUKIB
2025-12-09 Pro-Russia Hacktivists Conduct Opportunistic Attacks Against U.S. and Global Critical Infrastructure FBI, CISA, National Security Agency (NSA), and the following partners—hereafter referred to as “the authoring organizations”—are releasing this joint advisory on the targeting of critical infrastructure by proRussia hacktivists: The authoring organizations assess pro-Russia hacktivist groups are conducting less sophisticated, lowerimpact attacks against critical infrastructure entities, compared to advanced persistent threat (APT) groups. ASD/ACSC CCCS DC3 DOE EC3 EPA FBI NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA NUKIB
2025-09-29 Creating and Maintaining a Definitive View of Your Operational Technology (OT) Architecture It is aimed at cyber security professionals working in organisations that deploy or operate OT across greenfield and brownfield deployments. Integrators and device manufactures can also use these principles to ensure their solutions enable effective asset and configuration management. ASD/ACSC CCCS CISA FBI NCSC-NL NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK
2025-09-03 Joint Guidance: A Shared Vision of Software Bill Of Materials For Cybersecurity Widespread adoption of SBOM will strengthen security, reduce risk, and Most modern software is comprised of software components, modules, and libraries from open source and proprietary software worlds, rather than developers creating it from scratch. As concerns about the security and provenance of software grow, it is critical to understand the risks in the software’s supply chain— including the risks of the underlying software components. ANSSI ASD/ACSC CCCS CISA CSA NCO NCSC-NL NCSC-NZ NIS NSA NUKIB
2025-08-27 Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System Executive summary People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber threat actors are targeting networks globally, including, but not limited to, telecommunications, government, transportation, lodging, and military infrastructure networks. AISE AISI AIVD ASD/ACSC AW CCCS CISA CNI DC3 FBI MIVD NCO NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA NUKIB SKW SUPO
2025-08-27 Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System While these actors focus on large backbone routers of major telecommunications providers, as well as provider edge (PE) and customer edge (CE) routers, they also leverage compromised devices and trusted connections to pivot into other networks. These actors often modify routers to maintain persistent, long-term access to networks. AISE AISI AIVD ASD/ACSC AW CCCS CISA CNI DC3 FBI MIVD NCO NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA NUKIB SKW SUPO
2025-08-27 CSA: Countering China State Actors Compromise of Networks While these actors focus on large backbone routers of major telecommunications providers, as well as provider edge (PE) and customer edge (CE) routers, they also leverage compromised devices and trusted connections to pivot into other networks. These actors often modify routers to maintain persistent, long-term access to networks. AISE AISI AIVD ASD/ACSC AW CCCS CISA CNI DC3 FBI MIVD NCO NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA NUKIB SKW SUPO
2025-08-13 Foundations for OT Cybersecurity: Asset Inventory Guidance for Owners and Operators Using these tools helps owners and operators identify which assets in their environment should be secured and protected, and structure their defenses accordingly to reduce the risk a cybersecurity incident poses to the organization’s mission and service continuity. An asset inventory is an organized, regularly updated list of an organization’s systems, hardware, and software. ASD/ACSC CCCS CISA DOE EPA FBI NCSC-NL NCSC-NZ NSA
2025-05-21 Russian GRU Targeting Western Logistics Entities and Technology Companies This joint cybersecurity advisory (CSA) highlights a Russian state-sponsored cyber those involved in the coordination, transport, and delivery of foreign assistance to Ukraine. Since 2022, Western logistics entities and IT companies have faced an elevated risk of targeting by the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (85th GTsSS), military unit 26165—tracked in the cybersecurity community under… ANSSI ASD/ACSC CCCS DC3 DDIS EFIS FBI MIVD NCSC-UK NSA NUKIB SKW USCC
2025-01-13 Secure by Demand: Priority Considerations for Operational Technology Owners and Operators When Selecting Digital Products Many OT products are not designed and developed with Secure by Design principles1 and commonly have weaknesses, such as weak authentication, known software vulnerabilities, limited logging, insecure default settings and passwords, and insecure legacy protocols. Cyber threat actors can easily exploit these weaknesses across multiple victims to gain access to control systems. ASD/ACSC CCCS CISA EPA FBI NCSC-NL NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA TSA
2024-01-23 CSI: Engaging with Artificial Intelligence The purpose of this publication is to provide organisations with guidance on how to use AI systems securely. The paper summarises some important threats related to AI systems and prompts organisations to consider steps they can take to engage with AI while managing risk. ASD/ACSC CCCS CISA CSA FBI NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA