Joint Publications
17
All Time
Unique Partners
20
agencies co-sealed with
Most Frequent Partner
FBI
16 joint publications

Co-Sealed With

FBI 16
CISA 15
NSA 14
DOE 12
CCCS 10
TSA 6
BSI 4
USDA 2
NIST 2
Other 12

Partner Frequency — All Time

FBI
16
15
NSA
14
DOE
12
10
TSA
6
BSI
4
2
2
DC3
2
EC3
2
2
1
1
Joint Publications (17) — All Time
Date Publication Co-Sealers
2026-07-30 CISA Urges Water and Wastewater Systems Sector to Protect OT Against Activity Targeting PLCs These threat actors are targeting water entities of all sizes. Even water organizations with mature cybersecurity processes should validate their external connections, as this targeting activity includes cellular modems installed by operators, vendors, or system integrators that may not be documented or included in routine attack surface scans. CISA FBI
2026-06-02 CISA and Partners Urge Hardening Automatic Tank Gauge Systems The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the (EPA), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)—hereafter referred to as “the authoring organizations”—are aware of malicious cyber activity targeting U.S.-based automatic tank gauge (ATG) systems. CISA DOE FBI NSA TSA USDA
2026-04-07 Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across US Critical Infrastructure This activity has led to PLC disruptions across several U.S. critical infrastructure sectors through malicious interactions with the project file and manipulation of data on human machine interface (HMI) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) displays, resulting in operational disruption and financial loss. U.S. CISA CNMF DOE FBI NIST NSA
2025-12-09 Opportunistic Pro-Russia Hacktivists Attack US and Global Critical Infrastructure This advisory, published as an addition to the joint fact sheet on Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology (OT) released in May 2025 , details that pro-Russia hacktivist groups are conducting less sophisticated, lower-impact attacks against critical infrastructure entities, compared to advanced persistent threat groups. CISA DOE FBI NSA
2025-12-09 Pro-Russia Hacktivists Conduct Opportunistic Attacks Against US and Global Critical Infrastructure Actions for Operational Technology Owners and Operators to Take Today to Mitigate Cyber Threats Related to Pro-Russia Hacktivists Activity Reduce exposure of operational technology (OT) assets to the public-facing internet. Adopt mature asset management processes, including mapping data flows and access points. Ensure that OT assets are using robust authentication procedures. ASD/ACSC BSI CCCS CISA DC3 DOE EC3 FBI NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA NUKIB
2025-12-09 Pro-Russia Hacktivists Conduct Opportunistic Attacks Against U.S. and Global Critical Infrastructure FBI, CISA, National Security Agency (NSA), and the following partners—hereafter referred to as “the authoring organizations”—are releasing this joint advisory on the targeting of critical infrastructure by proRussia hacktivists: The authoring organizations assess pro-Russia hacktivist groups are conducting less sophisticated, lowerimpact attacks against critical infrastructure entities, compared to advanced persistent threat (APT) groups. ASD/ACSC BSI CCCS DC3 DOE EC3 FBI NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA NUKIB
2025-08-13 CISA and Partners Release Asset Inventory Guidance for Operational Technology Owners and Operators CISA, along with the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Environmental Protection Agency, and several international partners, released comprehensive guidance to help operational technology (OT) owners and operators across all critical infrastructure sectors create and maintain OT asset inventories and supplemental taxonomies. CISA FBI NSA
2025-08-13 Foundations for OT Cybersecurity: Asset Inventory Guidance for Owners and Operators Using these tools helps owners and operators identify which assets in their environment should be secured and protected, and structure their defenses accordingly to reduce the risk a cybersecurity incident poses to the organization’s mission and service continuity. An asset inventory is an organized, regularly updated list of an organization’s systems, hardware, and software. ASD/ACSC BSI CCCS CISA DOE FBI NCSC-NL NCSC-NZ NSA
2025-05-06 Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology The authoring organizations urge critical infrastructure entities to review and act now to improve their cybersecurity posture against cyber threat activities specifically and intentionally targeting internet connected OT and ICS. The authoring organizations recommend critical infrastructure asset owners and operators implement the following mitigations1 to defend against OT cyber threats. internet. CISA DOE FBI
2025-01-13 Secure by Demand: Priority Considerations for Operational Technology Owners and Operators When Selecting Digital Products Many OT products are not designed and developed with Secure by Design principles1 and commonly have weaknesses, such as weak authentication, known software vulnerabilities, limited logging, insecure default settings and passwords, and insecure legacy protocols. Cyber threat actors can easily exploit these weaknesses across multiple victims to gain access to control systems. ASD/ACSC BSI CCCS CISA FBI NCSC-NL NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA TSA
2024-12-18 CSA: IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit PLCs in Multiple Sectors, Including U.S. Water and Wastewater Systems Facilities (December 2024 update) IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit PLCs in Multiple Sectors, Including US Water and CCCS CISA FBI NCSC NSA
2024-12-13 CISA and EPA Release Joint Fact Sheet Detailing Risks Internet-Exposed HMIs Pose to WWS Sector This joint fact sheet provides Water and Wastewater Systems (WWS) facilities with recommendations for limiting the exposure of Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs) and securing them against malicious cyber activity. HMIs enable operational technology owners and operators to read supervisory control and data acquisition systems connected to programmable logic controllers. CISA
2024-05-01 Defending OT Operations Against Ongoing Pro-Russia Hacktivist Activity CCCS CISA DOE FBI MS-ISAC NCSC-UK NSA USDA
2024-03-21 PRC State-Sponsored Cyber Activity: Actions for Critical Infrastructure Leaders This fact sheet provides an overview for executive leaders on the urgent risk posed by People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber actors known as “Volt Typhoon.” CISA—along with the National Security Agency (NSA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other U.S. government and international partners1—released a major advisory on Feb. 7, 2024, in which the U.S. ASD/ACSC CCCS DOE FBI NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA TSA Treasury
2024-02-07 PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure For a downloadable copy of indicators of compromise (IOCs), see: MAR-10448362.c1.v2.CLEAR_stix2.json (JSON, 51. ASD/ACSC CCCS CISA DOE FBI NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NIST NSA TSA
2024-02-07 PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure Prioritize patching critical sponsored cyber actors are seeking to prevulnerabilities in appliances known to be position themselves on IT networks for disruptive frequently exploited by Volt Typhoon. or destructive cyberattacks against U.S. critical infrastructure in the event of a major crisis or conflict with the United States. ASD/ACSC CCCS CISA DOE FBI NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA TSA
2024-02-07 CTR: Joint Guidance: Identifying and Mitigating Living Off the Land Techniques This guide, authored by the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), agencies (hereafter referred to as the authoring agencies), provides information on common living off the land (LOTL) techniques and common gaps in cyber defense capabilities.  U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)  U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)  U.S. ASD/ACSC CCCS CISA DOE FBI NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA TSA