AIVD

AIVD Co-Seal Profile

Joint Publications
10
All Time
Unique Partners
31
agencies co-sealed with
Most Frequent Partner
FBI
9 joint publications

Co-Sealed With

FBI 9
NCSC-UK 9
CCCS 8
MIVD 8
ASD/ACSC 7
CISA 7
NCSC-NZ 7
NSA 7
DC3 6
BSI 5
NCO 5
AISE 4
Other 39

Partner Frequency — All Time

FBI
9
NCSC-UK
9
CCCS
8
MIVD
8
ASD/ACSC
7
CISA
7
NCSC-NZ
7
NSA
7
DC3
6
BSI
5
NCO
5
AISE
4
AISI
4
AW
4
CNI
4
NUKIB
4
SKW
4
SUPO
4
NCSC-SE
3
ANSSI
1
DCSA
1
DDIS
1
DGSI
1
EFIS
1
FDI
1
NCIS
1
SIS RM
1
Treasury
1
CSA
1
NIS
1
CNMF
1
Joint Publications (10) — All Time
Date Publication Co-Sealers
2026-09-15 UK and allies expose spyware used by Iranian state actors to target dissidents, activists and journalists state actors to target dissidents, activists and GCHQ’s National Cyber Security Centre and international partners issue warning over Iranian cyber actors’ spearphishing and spyware campaign ‘CHOSEN BRICK’ malware family used to collect information, including screen captures and messaging history, from UK and allies provide advice to help organisations and individuals at risk detect malicious activity and reduce chances of their devices falling vi… FBI NCSC-UK
2026-09-15 Iranian cyber targeting of dissidents, activists and journalists Advisory on CHOSEN BRICK malware, including technical analysis and advice to help individuals and organisations protect CHOSEN BRICK is a malware family that has been used to target individuals around the world including in the UK, US and the Netherlands from at least 2025. FBI NCSC-UK
2026-07-23 Russian State-Supported Cyber Actors Conduct Phishing Campaign Targeting Users of Zimbra Collaboration Suite Read our joint advisory on LAUNDRY BEAR's exploitation of Zimbra Collaboration Suite. AISE AISI ANSSI ASD/ACSC AW CCCS CISA CNI DC3 DCSA DDIS DGSI EFIS FBI FDI MIVD NCIS NCSC-NZ NCSC-SE NCSC-UK NSA NUKIB SIS RM SKW SUPO Treasury
2026-04-23 Defending Against China-Nexus Covert Networks of Compromised Devices Over the past few years there has been a major shift in the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used by China-nexus cyber actors, moving away from the use of individually procured infrastructure, and towards the use of externally provisioned, large-scale networks of compromised devices. ASD/ACSC BSI CCCS CISA DC3 FBI MIVD NCO NCSC-NZ NCSC-SE NCSC-UK NSA
2026-04-23 International cyber agencies share fresh advice to defend against China-linked covert networks GCHQ’s National Cyber Security Centre with UK industry and 15 international partners shine light on best protections against methods used by China-linked threat actors. Covert networks, often made up of compromised devices such as smart devices, are being used to disguise the origins and attributions of cyber attacks. ASD/ACSC BSI CCCS CISA DC3 FBI MIVD NCO NCSC-NZ NCSC-SE NCSC-UK NSA
2025-08-27 Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System Executive summary People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber threat actors are targeting networks globally, including, but not limited to, telecommunications, government, transportation, lodging, and military infrastructure networks. AISE AISI ASD/ACSC AW BSI CCCS CISA CNI DC3 FBI MIVD NCO NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA NUKIB SKW SUPO
2025-08-27 Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System While these actors focus on large backbone routers of major telecommunications providers, as well as provider edge (PE) and customer edge (CE) routers, they also leverage compromised devices and trusted connections to pivot into other networks. These actors often modify routers to maintain persistent, long-term access to networks. AISE AISI ASD/ACSC AW BSI CCCS CISA CNI DC3 FBI MIVD NCO NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA NUKIB SKW SUPO
2025-08-27 CSA: Countering China State Actors Compromise of Networks While these actors focus on large backbone routers of major telecommunications providers, as well as provider edge (PE) and customer edge (CE) routers, they also leverage compromised devices and trusted connections to pivot into other networks. These actors often modify routers to maintain persistent, long-term access to networks. AISE AISI ASD/ACSC AW BSI CCCS CISA CNI DC3 FBI MIVD NCO NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA NUKIB SKW SUPO
2024-08-21 ASD’s ACSC, CISA, FBI, and NSA, with the support of International Partners Release Best Practices for Event Logging and Threat Detection Logging priorities for enterprise mobility using mobile computing devices 10 Protecting event logs from unauthorised access, modification and deletion 11 This publication defines a baseline for event logging best practices to mitigate cyber threats. ASD/ACSC CCCS CISA CSA MIVD NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NIS NSA
2024-07-09 State-Sponsored Russian Media Leverages Meliorator Software for Foreign Malign Influence Activity Affiliates of RT (formerly Russia Today), a Russian state-sponsored media organization, used Meliorator—a covert artificial intelligence (AI) enhanced software package—to create fictitious online personas, representing a number of nationalities, to post content on X (formerly Twitter). CCCS CNMF FBI MIVD