SUPO Co-Seal Profile — CyberzSOC

Joint Publications

4

All Time

Unique Partners

28

agencies co-sealed with

Most Frequent Partner

AISE

4 joint publications

Co-Sealed With

AISE 4

AISI 4

AIVD 4

ASD/ACSC 4

AW 4

CCCS 4

CISA 4

CNI 4

DC3 4

FBI 4

MIVD 4

NCSC-NZ 4

Other 32

Partner Frequency — All Time

AISE

4

AISI

4

AIVD

4

ASD/ACSC

4

AW

4

CCCS

4

CISA

4

CNI

4

DC3

4

FBI

4

MIVD

4

NCSC-NZ

4

NCSC-UK

4

NSA

4

NUKIB

4

SKW

4

BSI

3

NCO

3

ANSSI

1

DCSA

1

DDIS

1

DGSI

1

EFIS

1

FDI

1

NCIS

1

NCSC-SE

1

SIS RM

1

Treasury

1

Joint Publications (4) — All Time

Date	Publication	Co-Sealers
2026-07-23	Russian State-Supported Cyber Actors Conduct Phishing Campaign Targeting Users of Zimbra Collaboration Suite Read our joint advisory on LAUNDRY BEAR's exploitation of Zimbra Collaboration Suite.	AISE AISI AIVD ANSSI ASD/ACSC AW CCCS CISA CNI DC3 DCSA DDIS DGSI EFIS FBI FDI MIVD NCIS NCSC-NZ NCSC-SE NCSC-UK NSA NUKIB SIS RM SKW Treasury
2025-08-27	Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System Executive summary People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber threat actors are targeting networks globally, including, but not limited to, telecommunications, government, transportation, lodging, and military infrastructure networks.	AISE AISI AIVD ASD/ACSC AW BSI CCCS CISA CNI DC3 FBI MIVD NCO NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA NUKIB SKW
2025-08-27	Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System While these actors focus on large backbone routers of major telecommunications providers, as well as provider edge (PE) and customer edge (CE) routers, they also leverage compromised devices and trusted connections to pivot into other networks. These actors often modify routers to maintain persistent, long-term access to networks.	AISE AISI AIVD ASD/ACSC AW BSI CCCS CISA CNI DC3 FBI MIVD NCO NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA NUKIB SKW
2025-08-27	CSA: Countering China State Actors Compromise of Networks While these actors focus on large backbone routers of major telecommunications providers, as well as provider edge (PE) and customer edge (CE) routers, they also leverage compromised devices and trusted connections to pivot into other networks. These actors often modify routers to maintain persistent, long-term access to networks.	AISE AISI AIVD ASD/ACSC AW BSI CCCS CISA CNI DC3 FBI MIVD NCO NCSC-NZ NCSC-UK NSA NUKIB SKW